The Minister of State Giorgos Gerapetritis and the outgoing Minister of Infrastructure and Transport Kostas Karamanlis in a meeting at the ministry follow the accident

Rail accident Greece: human error or systematic neglect?

The Minister of State Giorgos Gerapetritis and the outgoing Minister of Infrastructure and Transport Kostas Karamanlis in a meeting at the ministry follow the accident 2023, Greek ministry of Transport

The tragic railway accident involving a passenger and freight train in Greece has shocked the country and the world. With at least 46 people dead, and dozens missing and wounded, the accident triggered a series of resignations, including that of the Greek minister of transport. So far, it is attributed to human error that occurred due to “bad timing”; however, is this indeed the case?

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Author: Nikos Papatolios

Nikos Papatolios is an editor of RailFreight.com, the online magazine for rail freight professionals.

3 comments op “Rail accident Greece: human error or systematic neglect?”

bönström bönström|03.03.23|15:04

1.
Still, now, year 2023, “human factor”, has to be recognised a severe risk, thus duly outed from critical, risk functions!
2.
Tragedies caused by “human factor” is not “accidents”, but result of calculated risks!
(Media, “ours”, etc., shall finish, forgivingly, using “accident”, when not appropriate!)

Joachim Falkenhagen|03.03.23|18:27

Certainly we have (1) a lack of train control system, and (2) the station master was “new at the job” and probably inattentive (police will have checked his mobile phone activities). In the 19th century, railways also functioned without electronic train control.

(3) The operator “asked the passenger train to switch lines” without thinking about the freight train. Switching to the opposite lime would only be ordered for a reason. This additional cause of the accident also needs attention.

Avi Harel|11.03.23|08:50

It is possible to affect operator’s behavior by administrative instructions, such as training, incentives, etc. This cannot not eliminate spontaneous activity, which sometimes results in accidents.
The system control should follow the Safety II paradigm, which means that the design constrains the system activity. The principles for the applying self control were introduced in 2004 with the STAMP paradigm, and ways to implement it were proposed by the methodology of scenario-based modelling.

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Rail accident Greece: human error or systematic neglect? | RailTech.com
The Minister of State Giorgos Gerapetritis and the outgoing Minister of Infrastructure and Transport Kostas Karamanlis in a meeting at the ministry follow the accident

Rail accident Greece: human error or systematic neglect?

The Minister of State Giorgos Gerapetritis and the outgoing Minister of Infrastructure and Transport Kostas Karamanlis in a meeting at the ministry follow the accident 2023, Greek ministry of Transport

The tragic railway accident involving a passenger and freight train in Greece has shocked the country and the world. With at least 46 people dead, and dozens missing and wounded, the accident triggered a series of resignations, including that of the Greek minister of transport. So far, it is attributed to human error that occurred due to “bad timing”; however, is this indeed the case?

Want to read more?

Subscribe now!

Take advantage of our exclusive offer to get full access to all premium content.

See the offer

Author: Nikos Papatolios

Nikos Papatolios is an editor of RailFreight.com, the online magazine for rail freight professionals.

3 comments op “Rail accident Greece: human error or systematic neglect?”

bönström bönström|03.03.23|15:04

1.
Still, now, year 2023, “human factor”, has to be recognised a severe risk, thus duly outed from critical, risk functions!
2.
Tragedies caused by “human factor” is not “accidents”, but result of calculated risks!
(Media, “ours”, etc., shall finish, forgivingly, using “accident”, when not appropriate!)

Joachim Falkenhagen|03.03.23|18:27

Certainly we have (1) a lack of train control system, and (2) the station master was “new at the job” and probably inattentive (police will have checked his mobile phone activities). In the 19th century, railways also functioned without electronic train control.

(3) The operator “asked the passenger train to switch lines” without thinking about the freight train. Switching to the opposite lime would only be ordered for a reason. This additional cause of the accident also needs attention.

Avi Harel|11.03.23|08:50

It is possible to affect operator’s behavior by administrative instructions, such as training, incentives, etc. This cannot not eliminate spontaneous activity, which sometimes results in accidents.
The system control should follow the Safety II paradigm, which means that the design constrains the system activity. The principles for the applying self control were introduced in 2004 with the STAMP paradigm, and ways to implement it were proposed by the methodology of scenario-based modelling.

Add your comment

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